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FORMER TESTIMONY UNDER THE UNIFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE AND IN FLORIDA*
MANDELL GLICKSBERG *

The Model Code of Evidence, a project of the American Law Institute, was approved by that group in 1942. Although the Code was
a far-reaching step in the direction of law reform, it has never been
favorably accepted by the legal profession.
In an attempt to remedy the unfavorable aspects of the Model
Code the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws undertook to draft a set of uniform rules that would prove more acceptable to the profession. The project resulted in the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, which received the approval of the Conference on August
22, 1953. The Rules also received the approval of the American Bar
Association in 1953 and the American Law Institute in 1954. Neither
the Model Code nor the Uniform Rules have been enacted into law
in any jurisdiction.' Nevertheless, they have generated a great deal
of thought and discussion, and they merit the serious consideration
of everyone interested in the improvement of the administration of
justice.2
In view of the widespread interest in the proposed reforms, this
artide, although it deals with only a small segment of the rules of
evidence, may prove helpful in illustrating the provisions of the
Model Code and the Uniform Rules in the context of the generally
prevailing law. The Uniform Rules are now the center of discussion,
but the Model Code provisions will also be analyzed for comparison
purposes and as background material.
*Based on a paper submitted in a Seminar on Problems of Evidence given in
the 1956 Summer Law Teachers Program at New York University School of Law
by Professor Judson F. Falknor.
E*B.A.
1949, LL.B. 1951, University of Florida; Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida.
'The Uniform Rules of Evidence are being considered for adoption in at least
two jurisdictions. See Clark, Foreword to Symposium on the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 10 RuTGmRs L. Rsv. 479 (1956).
2The background of the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence is discussed in Whinery, The Uniform Rules of Evidence and the North
Dakota Law of Evidence, 32 N. DAK. L. Rav. 205 (1956). See also Chadbourn, The
"Uniform Rules" and the California Law of Evidence, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1954).
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COMPARISON OF THE MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE WITH THE UNIFORM

RULES OF EVIDENCE

The usual method of presenting verbal evidence during a trial
is to question the witness in open court. Sometimes, however, die
desired testimony has already been elicited from the witness on a
previous occasion, either by way of deposition or in the form of
testimony at an earlier trial. This article discusses the use of prior
testimony to prove the truth of the matters therein asserted. In so
far as depositions taken for use in the trial of an action are treated
by the applicable provisions of the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules, they also will be discussed.
Testimony taken on a previous occasion may be used at a later
trial for several purposes. If used to refresh the memory of a witness or for impeachment, for example, the hearsay rule has no application. When former testimony or depositions taken for use at a
prior trial are offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matters
stated, however, the general view is that such evidence is hearsay.
For this evidence to be admissible the orthodox American rule basically requires that three conditions be met. These conditions relate to
identity of parties at both trials, identity of issues, and a sufficient
showing that the witness is unavailable at the later trial.
Model Code of Evidence
Under Rule 511, former testimony is admissible for any purpose
for which it was admissible in the prior action, thus eliminating any
requirement of identity of issues or parties. Rules 9 (f) and 10 of the
Model Code, however, make it clear that the evidence must be relevant before it will be admissible. A further safeguard upon abuse
of the liberal terms of Rule 511 is contained in Rule 303, which permits the judge, under certain circumstances, to exercise his discretion
as to admissibility.
The orthodox rule requires that the witness be unavailable before
his deposition or former testimony can be admitted as evidence in
the later trial. Although Rule 503 (a) flatly states that evidence of
a hearsay declaration is admissible if the declarant is unavailable,
subsection (b) of that rule goes on to admit all hearsay declarations
if the declarant is present and subject to cross-examination. Rule 511
states that depositions and former testimony are admissible "unless
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the judge finds that the declarant is available as a witness and in his
discretion rejects the evidence." It can be seen that the two subsections of Rule 503 cover all cases except those in which the witness is
available but not present for cross-examination. In this situation
Rule 511 will apply, and the judge may admit or reject the evidence
in his discretion.
It should also be pointed out that under the Model Code a deposition taken for use at the trial in which it is offered is not hearsay when offered at that trial. 3 Therefore, the provisions of Rule 511
do not apply to such depositions. The corresponding provision of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence treats these depositions as falling within
4
the hearsay rule, but admits them under an exception.
Uniform Rules of Evidence
Depositions and prior testimony are among the exceptions to the
hearsay rule contained in the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Rule 63 (3),
which treats this particular exception, does not go as far as the Model
Code in its departure from the prevailing American law. It does,
however, liberalize the rather strict orthodox doctrine.
Concerning depositions taken for use at the trial at which they
are offered, Rule 63 (3) (a) does not require that the witness be unavailable before the depositions can be admitted in evidence. 5 The
main reason for this change in the prevailing rule is probably that
depositions are a valuable means of proving facts about which there
is no serious dispute but which the other party declines to stipulate.6
It has been argued that the proposed rule will not result in disuse of
oral testimony, because the live witness is so far superior in convincing power to depositions that the parties will prefer oral testimony
on the main issues. 7 As a practical matter, if the witness is in fact
unavailable the deposition is admissible under the prevailing law.
And if the witness is available, but not produced, there is nothing
to prevent the other party from calling him, especially in view of
sMoDEL CoDE oF EvIDENCE Rule 501 (2) (1942).
4UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 63 (3) (1953).
5For an argument against this provision of the Uniform Rules, see A Symposium
on the Uniform Rules of Evidence and Illinois Evidence Law, 49 Nw. U.L. RE:V.
481, 494 (1954).
eSee McCormick, Hearsay, 10 RuTcans L. REv. 620, 623 (1956).
71bid.
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Rule 20 of the Uniform Rules, which permits a person to impeach
his own witness. Moreover, since this portion of Rule 63 (3) pertains
to depositions taken for use at the trial at which they are offered,
adequate safeguards, such as the opportunity for cross-examination by
the adverse party, are present at the time the depositions are taken.
Thus there is no valid reason for excluding them. It might be said
that it is preferable for the judge and jury to observe the witness as
he testifies. This is probably true, but, again, any party desiring to
give the court the benefit of a personal glimpse can call the witness.
Rule 63 (3) (b) pertains to the admissibility, in a subsequent action, of testimony given in another action, or of a deposition taken
for use in another action. This portion of the rule undoubtedly was
meant to apply to testimony given not only in another action but
also in a prior trial of the same case, although the use of the term
"another action" may raise some question as to the applicability of
the rule to this situation. The rule, in this regard, might well be
rephrased.
Rule 63 (3) (b) requires a finding that the declarant is unavailable as a witness in the subsequent trial before former testimony and
depositions taken for use in another action may be admitted. Furthermore, admissibility is dependent upon a finding that
" (i) the testimony is offered against a party who offered it in
his own behalf on the former occasion, or against the successor
in interest of such party, or (ii) the issue is such that the adverse party on the former occasion had the right and opportunity for cross examination with an interest and motive similar to that which the adverse party has in the action in which
the testimony is offered ....
If the declarant is available and present for cross-examination,
the type of evidence under discussion could come in under Rule 63 (1)
relating to previous statements. 8 When he is available but not present
for cross-examination, however, the previous testimony, although
admissible under Rule 511 of the Model Code, would not be admissible under Rule 63 (3) (b) of the Uniform Rules. The declarant must
be produced. As soon as he is, however, he is present for cross-examination, and the evidence is then admissible under Rule 63 (1).
8See Powers, The North Carolina Hearsay Rule and the Uniform Rules of

Evidence, 34 N.C.L. REv. 294, 305 (1956).
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HEARSAY?

There is a difference of opinion as to whether depositions and
former testimony offered to prove the truth of the facts stated constitute hearsay. The courts generally say that they do,9 and Professor McCormick has adopted a definition of hearsay that includes
this evidence. 10 On the other hand, Wigmore, supported by some
fcases," states that depositions and former testimony do not constitute hearsay.' 2 His view is that an adequate opportunity for crossexamination is necessary before this evidence can be admitted to
prove the truth of the facts stated, that this opportunity satisfies the
hearsay rule, and that no exception is needed. According to Wigmore
the opportunity for cross-examination is not adequate unless the testimony was given upon such an issue that the opponent in the previous
case had the same interest and motive in his cross-examination that
the present opponent has.' 3 An adequate opportunity, however, is
all that is required; it need not be exercised.' 4 When death or illness
of the witness prevents cross-examination, Wigmore states that it
would be harsh to exclude the testimony that had been obtained on
direct examination; he suggests leaving the admissibility of such evidence to the discretion of the trial judge.' 5
When an adequate opportunity for cross-examination or its equivalent exists it would seem to make little difference whether depositions
and former testimony are admitted in evidence under an exception
to the hearsay rule or under the view that the rule has been satisfied
and no exception is needed. The difference becomes important, however, when there is no equivalent of a present opportunity for crossexamination. In this event the evidence could be admitted under a
OSee, e.g., In re Cross' Estate, 166 Kan. 318, 323, 201 P.2d 1052, 1056 (1949);
Bachtel v. Bachtel, 97 Ohio App. 521, 526, 127 N.E.2d 761, 764 (1954); Lone Star
Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 308, 153 S.W.2d 681, 697 (1941).
10McCounfICK, EVIDENCE §230 (1954.)

"2E.g., Habig v. Bastian, 117 Fla. 864, 868, 158 So. 508, 510 (1935); Minneapolis
Mill Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 51 Minn. 304, 316, 53 N.W. 639, 642 (1892);
Garner v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 177 Pa. Super. 439, 446, 110 A.2d 907,
911 (1955).
125 WmIo.RE, EVIDENCE §1370 (3d ed. 1940).
"135id. §1388.
145 id. §1371.
155 id. §1390.

See Jaiser v. Milligan, 120 F. Supp. 599 (D. Neb. 1954) (testimnony obtained on direct examination admitted although witness died after partial
cross-examination); 9 ARK. L. REv. 170 (1955).
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liberal exception, 16 whereas it would not fulfill the requirements set
forth by Wigmore.
It should be borne in mind that this article is confined to the
use of prior testimony to prove the truth of the facts stated. This
evidence may also be used for impeachment purposes, or it may fall
under some other exception to the hearsay rule, such as that pertaining to the admission of a party. The following discussion and
requirements do not apply to these last named situations.
CONFRONTATION

Provisions in the United States Constitution 1 7 and nearly every
state constitution's guarantee to the accused in a criminal case the
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The common
law right of confrontation, which had its origin in the establishment
of the hearsay rule, merely meant the right to cross-examination., 9
The use of former testimony upon a proper showing that the witness
was unavailable was recognized prior to the adoption of these constitutional provisions.2 0 The controversy regarding the effect of such
constitutional provisions on the admissibility of depositions and
former testimony, therefore, hinges on a determination of whether
these provisions change the common law requirement or merely put
it beyond the possibility of abolition by statute. Professor Wigmore
prefers the latter view, stating that at common law it was cross-examination, and not a separate right of confrontation, that was essential.
Confrontation secured cross-examination, but it was the cross-examination that was vital. The constitutional provisions merely secure
this right.21 The opposing argument is based on a strict and technical
reading of these provisions, giving rise to the conclusion that the
witness must actually confront the accused at the trial. This interpretation fails to take into account the historical background of
the confrontation provisions.
16See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §230 (1954).
1-U.S. CONsr. amend. V1.

3SE.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, §6; CONN. CONsr. art. I, §9; FLA. CONST. Decl. of
Rights, §11; ILL. CoNsr. art. II, §9.
19People v. Schwarz, 78 Cal. App. 561, 248 Pac. 990 (1926); State v. Logan, 344
Mo. 351, 126 S.W.2d 256 (1939); People v. Hines, 284 N.Y. 93, 29 N.E.2d '483 (1940);
see 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1397 (3d ed. 1940).
20MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §231 (1954).

21See note 19 supra.
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The right of confrontation serves more than one purpose. 22 In addition to supplying the opportunity for cross-examination, which is
essential, it permits the court to observe the demeanor of the witness,
and it supposedly makes a false accusation more difficult by affording
23
This
the accused an opportunity to look the witness in the eye.
third purpose and the opportunity for cross-examination are present
when testimony has been taken at a prior hearing or by way of deposition. The only thing lacking in such a case is the opportunity
for the court at the subsequent trial to observe the witness's demeanor. This opportunity, however, although desirable, is not required and may be dispensed with in case of necessity. 24
Neither Rule 511 of the Model Code nor Rule 63 (3) of the Uniform Rules requires cross-examination by the adverse party before
depositions or former testimony may be admitted in evidence at a
later trial. It would seem that even a liberal interpretation of the
constitutional provisions relating to confrontation would result in
the requirement that the accused himself be afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses against him, although not necessarily
in the presence of the court before which he was then being tried.
25
As stated by the United States Supreme Court:
"The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of
seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the
ordeal of a cross-examination. This, the law says, he shall
under no circumstances be deprived of. . ..."
An excellent chance exists, then, that the provisions of the Model
Code and the Uniform Rules may violate constitutional provisions
pertaining to confrontation. This questionable aspect of Rule 63 (3)
2
was recognized when the Uniform Rules were drafted. 6
As in the case of former testimony, there should be no objection
to the use of depositions by the prosecution in a criminal case. They
do not infringe the right of confrontation any more than does prior
22See State v. Heffernan, 24 S.D. 1, 9, 123 N.W. 87, 88 (1909); accord, Blache
v. Blache, 37 Cal.2d 531, 535, 233 P.2d 547, 549 (1951).
23See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §231 (1954).
24Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); Smith v. State, 147 Ga. 689,
693, 95 S.E. 281, 283 (1918).
25Mattox v. United States, supra note 24, at 244.
26UNiFoRm RuLEs OF EVIDENCE, Prefatory Note, and Rule 63 (3) Comment (1953).
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testimony. Nevertheless, many states do not have statutes authorizing the taking of depositions on behalf of the prosecution. Therefore they are not used, not because courts have held that they violate
the constitution but because of the lack of authority in anyone to
take them. It is probable that at least some legislatures failed to provide such authority because of doubt created by the confrontation
provisions.

27

IDENTITY OF PARTIES

The orthodox rule requires identity of parties as a prerequisite
to the admissibility of depositions and former testimony. The older
cases not only required that the party against whom the former testimony is now being offered must have been a party on the former
occasion but they also insisted on "reciprocity" or "mutuality," that
is, that the party offering the prior testimony must have been a party
at the previous trial. The authorities agree that this requirement of
mutuality is not based on any sensible or justifiable reason 2 8 and the
cases seem to be abandoning it.29 Professor McCormick states that the
so-called requirement of identity of parties, together with the requirement based on identity of issues, is merely a means of fulfilling
the policy of securing an adequate opportunity for cross-examination
by the party against whom the evidence is now offered.30 Wigmore
states that the requirement of identity of parties is only an incident
or corollary of the requirement of identity of issues. 31 Accordingly, he
formulated his rule as follows:32

"It ought, then, to be sufficient to inquire whether the
former testimony was given upon such an issue that the partyopponent in that case had the same interest and motive in his
27See

MCCORMicK, EVIDENCE §231

(1954); 5

VIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1398

(3d ed.

1940).
28 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §232 (1954); 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
225 (1954); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1388 (3d ed. 1940); Falknor, The Hearsay Rule
and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 43 (1954).
29E.g., Rivera v. American Export Lines, 13 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); School

Dist. v. Sachse, 274 Mich. 345, 264 N.W. 396 (1936); Briggs v. Chicago G.W. Rv.,
248 Minn. 418, 426, 80 N.W.2d 625, 633 (1957) (dictum).
30MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§232-33 (1954).
315 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1388 (3d ed. 1940).
321bid.
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cross-examination that the present opponent has; and the determination of this ought to be left entirely to the trial judge

This, of course, is a modification of the orthodox rule, and is
substantially the rule set forth in the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
The Model Code goes further and does away with any need for
similarity of issues or parties, except as they bear on, the relevancy
of the evidence.
The tendency to do away with the strict requirement of identity
of parties is reflected in the fairly recent leading case of Bartlett v.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co.33 The husband of a woman who was injured in a bus accident brought suit for loss of her services. Subsequently, at the trial of the wife's personal injury suit, the defendant attempted to introduce the testimony elicited from two
witnesses at the former trial. Both wiiesses were out of- the jurisdiction at the time. The court admitted the former' :testimony over
the wife's objection, holding that absolute identity of parties in the
two cases was not necessary. The court took into account the fact
that the husband and wife had the same motive to cross-examine.
It should also be noted .that the same attorney represented both plaintiffs. This decision has been referred to as "a sensible extension of
34
I
the established rule."
The argument has been made that. in one respect Rule 63 (3) of
the Uniform Rules goes too far in rendering depositions and former
testimony admissible. Professor Falknor, while agreeing that the idea
of identity of parties on both sides cannot rationally be supported,
suggests that the requirement of identity of opponent should not be
relaxed.35 Accordingly, he suggests an amendment to Rule 63 (3) that
would require the party against whom former testimony is being
offered to be the same as, or the successor in interest of, the party
against whom such testimony was offered at the prior trial. It should
be borne in mind that this amendment, as well as Rule 63 (3), would
admit former testimony when offered against a party, or his successor
in interest, who introduced it in his own behalf on the prior occasion.
There is forcefulness in the argument advanced by Professor FalkMo. 13, '160 S.W.2d 740; 142 A.L.R. 666 '(1942).
34Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HAv. L. REv. 481, 552 "(1946).
-35Falknor, The-Hearsay Rule and Its Eiceptions-,'2 U.C.L.A:L: -REv. 43 (1954).
38349
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nor. It is at its strongest when it is made to someone who is in the
position of having to accept cross-examination conducted by another
party.36 It has been contended that insistence upon the equivalent of
a present opportunity to cross-examine fails to take into account the
other elements of reliability in former testimony, such as the oath,
the solemnity of the occasion, and the accuracy of transcribed testimony.37 This of course is no answer to the party who insists that he
wants to cross-examine the witness against him. Admittedly it is
highly desirable for a party to be afforded the opportunity to conduct
his own cross-examination of an adverse witness. Moreover, the oath
and the solemnity of the occasion have lost much of their significance
over the years; they undoubtedly do not impress many of the witnesses whose testimony could be damaged materially by cross-examination. Nevertheless, former testimony that has been subjected to
the test of cross-examination by another party with a similar interest
and motive should be as reliable as any other form of hearsay, if not
more so. An insistence upon a present opportunity to cross-examine
the witness would keep out such testimony. The prior testimony
may be disbelieved; the absent witness can be impeached; and contrary testimony can be introduced, if any is available. These should
normally be adequate safeguards in what is admittedly a difficult
situation.
The fact that the suggested amendment is in line with the prevailing law may make it more acceptable. Assuming that it is adopted,
and taking into consideration the fact that the use of former testimony
may often arise in cases involving parties who are related not only
in interest but also in other respects, as in the Bartlett case, it does
not seem unreasonable to suggest that such testimony be admitted
against a party who is represented by the same attorney who represented the party against whom the testimony was offered at the prior
trial2 It is the lawyer and not the party who conducts the cross36Professor Wigmore apparently

held a different view of human

nature, as

illustrated by the following statement: "At first sight, indeed, it seems fair enough
to argue . . . that a person against whom former testimony is now offered should
have to be satisfied with such cross-examination as any other person whatever, in
another suit, may have chosen to employ." 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1388 (3d ed.

1940).
37McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE §230 (1954).

38This could be accomplished by inserting in Professor Falknor's amendment
the portion indicated by italics:
[Notwithstanding the general prohibition of hearsay, there shall be exception-
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examination. There would seem to be as much reason for admitting
former testimony in situations in which different parties with similar
interests were represented by the same lawyer at both trials as in
cases in which the party was the same on both occasions but his
attorney was different. In fact, the difference in attorneys may have
been caused by the party's desire for a more effective trial lawyer.
There are, of course, certain disadvantages inherent in the suggested change. It would, for example, make the admissibility of this
testimony dependent upon a party's choice of counsel. Furthermore,
recognizing the fact that cross-examination may be aided by the client,
the party at the second trial may justifiably complain about having
to be content with cross-examination conducted by his attorney while
representing another party. No argument is being made for the
adoption of this change; it is merely set forth as a possible means of
bringing Professor Falknor's amendment more in line with the liberal
provisions of the Uniform Rules while still satisfying the policy behind the requirement of identity of opponents.
IDENTITY oF IssuEs

Cross-examination, in order to be effective, must be directed to the
material points in controversy. The orthodox rule regarding the
admissibility of former testimony and depositions seeks to ensure adequate and effective cross-examination by the so-called requirement
of identity of issues. Precise identity is not necessary; it is sufficient
if there is substantial identity of the issues to which the testimony
was directed on the previous occasion and upon which it is offered
at the later trial 9 The Florida Court has held, for example, that
ally admitted:]
"(b) if the judge finds that the declarant is unavailable as a witness in a hearing,
testimony given in another action relating to the same matter or in a deposition
taken in compliance with law for use as testimony in the trial of another action
relating to the same matter, when (i) the testimony is offered against a party who
offered it in his own behalf on the former occasion, or against the successor in
interest of such party, or (ii) the testimony is offered against a party against whom,
or against whose predecessor in interest, [or against a party who is represented by
counsel who represented a party against whom,] it was offered on the former
occasion." Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.LA.L. Rav. 43,
55 (1954).
39E.g., Briggs v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 80 N.W.2d 625 (1957);
State v. Brown, 331 Mo. 556, 56 S.W.2d 405 (1932); Lynch's Adm'r v. Murray, 86
Vt 1, 83 Ad. 746 (1912); Illinois Steel Co. v. Muza, 164 Wis. 247, 159 N.W. 908
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be oftestimony taken at a trial involving simple negligence could
40
fered at a later trial involving the issue of gross negligence.
The Model Code dispenses with any requirement of identity of
issues. The Uniform Rules provide that the issue must be such that
the adverse party at the previous trial had the opportunity for crossexamination, with an interest and motive similar to that of the party
against whom the testimony is offered at the later trial. The extent
to which a state will require identity of issues may well depend on
the scope of cross-examination permitted. In a state allowing a wide
scope of cross-examination, if all the issues in the second trial were
not present in the first, the party against whom the former testimony
is offered will be deprived of his right to cross-examine the absent
witness on these issues.

41

UNAVAILABILITY

Unavailability of the witness is a prerequisite to the admissibility
of former testimony to prove the truth of the facts stated. Rule 63 (3)
of the Uniform Rules adopts this requirement, and Rule 62 (7) sets
forth the situations in which a witness is deemed unavailable. Under
the Model Code such evidence is admissible without regard to the
availability of the witness unless he is available but not present for
cross-examination, in which event the judge in his discretion may
reject the evidence. The definition of unavailability in the Model
Code is set forth in Rule 1 (15); it is basically the same as that of the
Uniform Rules.
Some of the commonly accepted grounds of unavailability besides
death are absence from the jurisdiction, extreme physical disability,
mental incapacity, privilege, failure of memory, and inability to lo4
cate the witness. ?
(1916).
40McDougald v. Imler, 153 Fla. 619, 15 So.2d 418 (1943).
4
lSee Powers, The North Carolina Hearsay Rule and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 34 N.C.L. REv. 294, 303 (1956); A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of
Evidence and Illinois Evidence Law, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 481, 483 (1954).
42Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (death); Jacobi v. State, 133 Ala.
1, 32 So. 158 (1902) (absence from jurisdiction); Bridges v. State, 26 Ala. App. I,
152 So. 51 (1933) (privilege); Putnal v. State, 56 Fla. 86, 47 So. 864 (1908) (whereabouts unknown); State v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 107 La. 1, 31 So. 395
(1901) (failure of memory); Lyons v. State, 26 Okla. Crim. 41, 133 P.2d 898 (1943)
(physical disability); Smith v. Smith, 234 S.W. 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (mental
incapacity).
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In a Michigan case involving the privilege against self-incrimination as a ground of unavailability, a witness had testified for the
state at a preliminary hearing. At the trial he invoked the privilege
and refused to answer certain questions, although he had received an
apparently effective grant of immunity. His previous testimony was
then admitted in evidence over the defendant's objection. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the -conviction, stating that "by invoking the privilege ... [the witness] although having been granted immunity, made himself as 'unavailable' as if he were deceased or absent from the jurisdiction." 43 Had the privilege been properly invoked, the decision undoubtedly would be correct. Strictly speaking,
however, the witness, having been granted immunity, was available.

As a practical matter, in such a situation there is really no reason
forexcluding the previous testimony. If a witness is forced to testify
under a grant of immunity, he will at best be a reluctant one; it
would seem that justice would more- nearly' be served 'by providing
the.court with-both the previous and the present testimony.' If he
absolutely refuses, despite the threat of contempt proceedings, his
testimony is as unavailable as if he were not present.
A troublesome situation may arise under the Uniform Rules when
absence'from the jurisdiction is the ground relied upon for a finding
of unavailability. Rule 62 (7) requires the present deposition of an
absent'witness to be taken if it can be accomplished by the exercise
of reasonable diligence, without undue hardship, and the importance
of the testimony justifies the expense "involved.4" When the former
testimony of the absent witness is available, it should be. as reliable
as a present deposition, if not more so, especially if the former trial
was between the same parties and at a considerably earlier date.
As it now stands, a party cannot be certain whether he must take
the' deposition of an absent witness whose former testimony is available or whether he can rely on the former testimony, unless, of course,
the judge makes a ruling during pretrial procedure.
FoiptER

TESTIMONY IN FLORIDA4

The Florida Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the question
43People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 306, 63 N.W2d 681, 687, 45 "A.L.R.2d 1341,
1350 (1954); see Falknor, Evidetice, 30 N.Y.U!L. REv. 927,"932 (1955).
44The elimination of this provision has been advocated in A Sympbsiuin, supa'
note 41, at 495.
'
450n the related topic of depositions see, for dvil depositionts, 1954 FLA. R. Civ.
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of admissibility of former testimony in Simmons v. Spratt, 6 decided
in 1890. The Court held that it was error to admit into evidence the
bill of exceptions taken on the first trial of the cause, containing the
testimony of a witness who had since died. It stated that the evidence
contained in a bill of exceptions is nothing more than a certificate
of the trial judge, or a subsequent statement by third parties, lacking
the sanction of an oath, and is not admissible of itself to prove
the truth of the prior testimony. The Court stated that the bill
of exceptions was admissible to refresh memory and that living witnesses who heard the former testimony should be called upon to
testify as to its nature. It was indicated that, if the bill of exceptions
by itself was the only method available by which the prior testimony
could be proved, it would be admissible for that purpose. No such
showing had been made in the case, however. It should be noted
that the case actually dealt with the mode of proof of the former
testimony 47 rather than the right to prove it.
When the Simmons case was decided, there was no statute in
Florida concerning the admissibility of prior testimony. In 1893 the
following statute was enacted:4 8
"[I1n case any judgment at law rendered by a Circuit Court
shall be reversed and a new trial awarded, and it be made to
appear to the satisfaction of the court that any evidence used
at the former trial, whether oral or written, and incorporated
in the bill of exceptions, cannot be had, then the bill of exceptions taken at the previous trial may be used as evidence
upon any subsequent trial of the case, as to any matter in issue
at the former trial."
In 1908 the Florida Court decided Putnal v. State.4 9 The Court
permitted the use in a second trial of testimony given in a prior trial
of the defendant in the mayor's court, in which he had been convicted
for selling liquor in a dry county. In the second trial, in the circuit
P.; Mehrtens, Deposition and Discovery in Florida Under the Federal Rules, 1 U.
FLA. L. REV. 149 (1948); for criminal depositions, FLA. STAT. §§902.12, .15-.17,
916.06 (1955).
4626 Fla. 449, 8 So. 123 (1890).
47For a discussion of mode of proof of former testimony see Annot., I1 A.L.R.2d
30 (1950).
48Fla. Laws 1893, c. 4135, §1.
4956 Fla. 86, 47 So. 864 (1908).
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court for selling liquor without a license, the prosecution proved the
former testimony by a witness who had heard it. The whereabouts of
the original witness were unknown at the time of the later trial.
Despite defendant's objections based on the hearsay rule and the
right of confrontation, the Court held that this procedure was proper,
laying down the following requirements: (1) The party against whom
the evidence is offered, or his privy, must have been a party at the
former trial; (2) the issues must be substantially the same; (3) the
witness who testifies about the former testimony must be able to state
it with satisfactory correctness; and (4) a sufficient reason must be
shown for the unavailability of the witness. The Court felt that these
conditions had been met.
The 1893 statute had no bearing on the Putnal case, since the
later trial in that case did not take place as the result of a reversal of
the judgment of a circuit court. The statute was not mentioned in
the decision. This would not be remarkable except for the fact that
the Putnal case has been cited by the Court as one involving the
statute.50
Shortly after this decision, and apparently as a result of it,51 the
Legislature amended the statute by adding a proviso to the effect
that no former testimony would be admissible except as provided in
the original act.52 The Florida Court subsequently held that the
statute provided the exclusive method by which former testimony
could be proved, stating that it was error to admit proof of such testimony at a later trial of the same case other than by introducing the
3
bill of exceptions containing the testimony.5
The applicability of the statute arose again in Blackwell v. State.54
The Court admitted the former testimony, contained in the bill of
exceptions, upon a showing that the absent witness was ill and would
be unable to appear in court for at least two weeks. The defendant
objected on the ground of lack of confrontation, but the Court held
that the constitutional provision affording this right had been satisfied by the defendant's cross-examination of the absent witness at the

OoBlackwell v. State, 79 Fla. 709, 752, 86 So. 224, 237 (1920) (dissenting opinion);
Bennett v. State, 68 Fla. 494, 498, 67 So. 125, 126 (1914); Johnson v. State, 68 Fla.
528, 532, 67 So. 100, 101 (1914).
SiSee Johnson v. State, 68 Fla. 528, 67 So. 100 (1914).
52Fla. Laws 1909, c. 5897, §1.
S3Johnson v. State, supra note 51; Coley v. State, 67 Fla. 178, 64 So. 751 (1914).
5479 Fla. 709, 86 So. 224 (1920).
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former trial. In this case, as in two others, 55 all involving the crime
of murder, the Court assumed that the statute applied to criminal
cases. The dissenting justices in the Blackwell case 56 disputed this,
believing that the statute should apply only to civil cases. They also
felt that the defendant had been deprived of his right of confrontation
on the second trial. This view was based on a strict construction of
the Florida constitutional provision which states that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right .. .to meet the witnesses against him face to face." ' 7
In 1919 the statute in question was amended58 to provide that
testimony at a former trial, if incorporated in a bill of exceptions or
the record of the trial, could be used at any later trial or hearing of
the case as to any matter in issue at the former trial, if it appeared
that the original could not be had. The statute also allowed the use
in a subsequent trial of former testimony not contained in a bill of exceptions or in the trial record if the evidence had been reduced to
writing in the presence of the court, and if the four conditions set
forth in the Putnal case were met. This amendment was not considered in the Blackwell case because the trials in that case took place
prior to 1919, although the opinion was not rendered until 1920.
In 1921 the Legislature limited the application of the act to civil
cases and broadened its scope by allowing testimony preserved in a
bill of exceptions or trial record to be used in any later trial as to
any matter in issue at the earlier trial.59 The 1919 version had
limited the admissibility of such testimony to later trials of the same
case. The 1921 amendment also added the proviso that "in all
criminal cases the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses
against him face to face at every trial, and testimony of a witness
given upon a trial of a criminal cause shall not be admitted against
an accused person in a subsequent trial, but the witness shall be produced."
The 1921 amendment was passed to nullify the effect of the decision in the Blackwell case and to ensure that an accused would meet
the witnesses against him face to face, literally, at every trial.60 The
statute currently in effect is identical with the 1921 version except
55See note 53 supra.
5679 Fla. 709, 743, 86 So.224, 234 (1920).
57FLA. CONsT. Ded. of Rights §11.
58Fla. Laws 1919, c. 7838, § 10(6).
59Fla. Laws 1921, c. 8572, §1.
60See Young v. State, 85 Fla. 348, 356, 96 So. 381, 383 (1923).
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1
that the proviso quoted above has been omitted.6 The current stat2
ute reads:1

"In the event it be made to appear to the satisfaction of the
court that any evidence used at a trial of a civil case, whether
oral or written, and incorporated in a bill of exceptions, or incorporated in the record proper can not be had, then the bill
of exceptions taken at the trial, or the evidence incorporated
in the record of the trial, may be used as evidence upon any
subsequent trial or hearing of the case, or in any other civil
cause or civil proceeding, as to any matter in issue at a previous
trial or hearing; and, further, in the event that such evidence is
not so preserved as before stated, then the same may be used
at a subsequent trial or hearing, or in any other civil cause or
civil proceeding involving substantially the same issue; if (1)
such evidence has at such former trial been reported stenographically or reduced to writing in the presence of the court;
(2) that the party against whom the evidence is offered, or his
privy, was a party on the former trial; (3) that the issue is substantially the same in both cases; (4) that a substantial reason
is shown why the original witness or document is not produced;
and, (5) that the court is satisfied that the report of such evidence taken at such former trial is a correct report."
This statute has two distinct parts. The first portion, pertaining
to evidence incorporated in a bill of exceptions63 or in the record
proper, requires a showing that the original evidence cannot be had,
and only permits the former evidence to be used at the subsequent
trial as to any matter in issue at the previous trial or hearing. No
mention is made regarding identity of parties, however. This portion
of the statute, from the date of its enactment in 1893 until the 1921
amendment, applied only to subsequent trials or hearings of the
same case. In 1921 the phrase "or in any other civil cause or civil
proceeding" was inserted. This has never been construed, but it is
certainly open to an interpretation permitting the use of properly preserved testimony at a later trial between different parties, provided
the matter was in issue at the prior trial. It is true that statutes of
61The proviso was superseded by FLA. STAT. §920.09 (1955), enacted as Fla.
Laws 1939, c. 19554, §246; see Revision Note, 2 FLA. STAT. §922.2 (1941).
62FLA. STAT. §92.22 (1955).
63Bills of exception are no longer required in Florida appellate procedure. See
FLA. STAT. §59.15 (1) (1955) and FLA. APP. RuEs.
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this type have been held to be declaratory of the common law,64 and
the common law requirement necessitated identity of parties. But
the latter portion of this statute, pertaining to evidence not preserved in a bill of exceptions or record of trial, is substantially in
line with the common law requirements. Clearly the legislature was
distinguishing between evidence preserved in a bill of exceptions or
record of trial and evidence not so preserved, and was relaxing the
requirements for use of the former. An interpretation dispensing
with the requirement of identity of parties in such a case would permit wider use of former testimony. This testimony, having been
given in a former trial involving a matter in issue at the present trial,
is highly reliable and should be admitted when the alternative is its
complete loss.
The second portion of the statute is substantially in line with the
orthodox rule regarding use of former testimony. It is a bit more
liberal in that it requires only identity of opponent rather than
identity of both parties. On the other hand, it does require that the
evidence be stenographically recorded or reduced to writing in the
presence of the court at the former trial and that the judge be
satisfied that the report is correct.
The Florida Court, although stating that a sufficient reason must
be given for the use of former testimony,65 has not set forth any definite criteria. The phrase "cannot be had" in the first portion of the
statute was construed in a criminal case 6 before the 1921 amendment.
The Court interpreted the phrase as vesting in the trial judge discretion as to the admission of former testimony contained in a bill
of exceptions. The Court held that the trial judge had not abused
his discretion by admitting the former testimony of a witness who
was absent because of temporary illness. Other grounds that the
Court has recognized are death, absence from the jurisdiction, and
insanity.67
Supervening disqualification has also been accepted as a ground
of unavailability. In Habig v. Bastian68 the defendant died after a
new trial had been granted but before it took place. At the new trial
the testimony of the plaintiff was objected to on the ground that it
was prohibited by the dead man statute. The plaintiff then offered
6

4See Habig v. Bastian, 117 Fla. 864, 869, 158 So. 508, 510 (1935).
65Ibid.
66Blackwell v. State, 79 Fla. 709. 724, 86 So. 224, 229 (1920).
67

See notes 64 and 66 supra.
6117 Fla. 864, 158 So. 508 (1935).
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his former testimony taken at the first trial, at which time he had
been subjected to direct, cross, redirect, recross, and recalled examination. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held
that the former testimony was admissible.
In Alexander v. Bess69 the defendant had testified at a hearing
to dissolve a temporary restraining order. The chancellor subsequently permitted this testimony to be used at the final hearing in
support of the allegations of the answer. The defendant, a widow,
was present at the final hearing but was not in condition to undergo
examination. It was shown that any evidence she would have given
at the final hearing would have been substantially the same as that
given on the previous hearing. The Florida Supreme Court, while
disapproving of this practice, stated that if it was error it was harmless and that no abuse of discretion on the part of the chancellor
was shown.
In a proceeding to annul a marriage the circuit court refused to
permit the introduction of a transcript of the testimony of a physician apparently taken in an earlier proceeding. The defendant's
counsel had never had a chance to question the witness, and there
was no showing that the witness was unavailable or that any attempt had been made to secure his attendance. The Supreme Court
held that the introduction of the evidence was purely in the discretion of the trial court and that no abuse of discretion had been shown.
The Court went on to state, however, that if the witness is available
his testimony in another case should not be substituted for oral evidence.7O
Apparently, then, although the Florida statute does not speak
in terms of unavailability, the Court has substantially adhered to the
recognized grounds upon which the use of former testimony is based.
If anything, the Court has been rather liberal in its determinations of
what will constitute sufficient justification.71 This perhaps results
from the fact that in most cases that have come before the Court
the evidence was admitted by the trial judge. The Court has vested
69123 Fla. 713, 167 So. 533 (1936).
7oAbbe v. Abbe, 68 So.2d 565 (1953).
,'See also Anderson v. Gaither, 120 Fla. 263, 162 So. 877 (1935). The deposition
of a witness had been taken and used at the first trial of the cause in 1929. At
the subsequent trial in 1933, the witness was available and testified. In addition,
his deposition that had been taken four years earlier was admitted in evidence, by
discretion of the court, on the ground that his memory at the time of giving the
deposition was obviously clearer as to details. The Supreme Court affirmed.
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discretion in the trial judge as to whether the reasons advanced for
the use of such testimony are sufficient.72 The question on appeal,
therefore, is one of abuse of discretion. In this situation the Court
is less likely to reverse a trial judge than if a ruling on a specific
ground of unavailability was required.
One further case merits discussion at this point. In an equity suit
involving a creditor's bill the final decree was reversed on appeal and
the cause remanded with directions to reconsider and rehear the case
after the pleadings were amended and further evidence taken. When
the case was submitted to the chancellor for the second time, he considered the testimony then in the record and all additional testimony
taken after the reversal of the prior final decree. The Court, in
holding that this procedure was propers7 3 apparently felt that a question of former testimony was involved, since it cited the current civil
statute and the case of McDougald v. Imler

4

in answer to appellants'

contention, which presumably was based on the view that the issues
under the amended pleadings differed from those under the original
pleadings.
There is no discussion as to whether the witnesses were available
to testify at the second hearing. If they were not, it is reasonable to
assume that the Court would have mentioned this fact. Assuming
that they were, this would seem to indicate that the Court was
either dispensing with or overlooking the requirement of unavailability. A close reading of the mandate, however, suggests that the
case did not involve a question of former testimony. The subsequent
hearing in the circuit court apparently was a further proceeding in
the original cause rather than a new trial. The testimony concerned,
therefore, was already before the court and was not being introduced
as former testimony.
In 1939 the Florida Legislature enacted a law pertaining to the
use of former testimony in criminal proceedings. 7 5 This act, which
has never been amended, reads:76
72Abbe v. Abbe, supra note 70; Alexander v. Bess, supra note 69; Blackwell v.
State, supra note 66. Clearly the discretion relates to the sufficiency of the reasons
advanced for the use of the testimony and not to admissibility, as such. But see
Touby, Evidence, 10 MIAMI L.Q. 472, 476 (1956).
73Hollingsworth v. Arcadia Citrus Growers Ass'n, 154 Fla. 399, 18 So.2d 159
(1944).
74153 Fla. 619, 15 So.2d 418 (1943). See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
75Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19554.
76FLA. STAT. §920.09 (1955).
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"When a new trial is granted such new trial shall proceed
in all respects as if no former trial had been had, but where
an offense is divided into degrees and the defendant has been
convicted of a lesser degree, he cannot thereafter be prosecuted
for a higher degree of the same offense.
"All the testimony in such former trial must be produced
anew, except of witnesses who are absent from the state or
dead, in which event the evidence of such witnesses on former
trial may be presented as the same was taken and transcribed
by the court reporter. Before the introduction of the evidence
of an absent witness, the party introducing same must show
that due diligence has been used to procure the attendance
of said witness at the trial, and that the witness is not absent
by consent or connivance of the party moving to introduce the
evidence of such witness on the former trial."
The portion of the statute concerning admissibility of former
testimony has not been construed by the Court. The wording of the
statute - stating that all testimony must be produced anew except
that of witnesses who are dead or out of the state - indicates that the
Legislature intended to preclude the use of any other generally accepted ground of unavailability. It has been held under statutes of
a similar type that one of the named grounds must be made to appear.7 7 An insane or disabled witness, however, is as unavailable as a
dead or absent one; and, assuming that the accepted safeguards of
reliability are present, there should be no reason for excluding such
evidence. This could be accomplished under the Florida statute by
interpreting it as declaratory of the common law and therefore not
the exclusive test of admissibility. Statutes interpreted in this fashion,
however, are usually permissive78 whereas the wording of the Florida
statute, by creating an exception, is restrictive in nature.
Furthermore, the statute mentions only the use of former testimony upon the granting of a new trial and does not purport to cover
its use on a subsequent occasion other than a new trial. The statute,
then, being inapplicable, would not necessarily prevent the use of
77People v. Bojorquez, 55 Cal. 463 (1880); People v. Rinesmith, 40 Cal. App.
2d 786, 105 P.2d 1021 (1940); Studdard v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 402, 27 S.W.2d 820
(1930); accord, Collins v. Leahy, 344 Mo. 250, 125 S.W.2d 874 (1939).
7sSee State v. Moore, 40 N.M. 344, 59 P.2d 902 (1936); State v. Trujillo, 33
N.M. 370. 266 Pac. 922 (1928); State v. Ham, 224 N.C. 128, 29 S.E.2d 449 (1944);
State v. Maynard, 184 N.C. 653, 113 S.E. 682 (1922).
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former testimony that was given, for example, at a judicial proceeding
other than a trial or at a trial of the accused in a different case involving substantially the same issues.79 On these occasions the former
testimony might be introduced under common law principles provided
it met the requirements. The argument has also been made that the
statute pertaining to civil cases should govern.80
This would seem to be the reasonable interpretation of the
statute, but it presents the anomalous situation of imposing greater
restrictions on the introduction of former testimony in a new trial
of the same case than, for example, in a subsequent trial of a different case involving substantially the same issues. This problem
would not arise if the 1921 proviso in the civil statute were still in
effect. The proviso, which flatly prohibited the use of former testimony in criminal cases, would control in all situations not covered
by the criminal statute. The revision note to the civil statute indicates
that the proviso was eliminated in the process of statutory revision
on the assumption that the 1939 criminal act had superseded it.81
Whether this was the intention of the Legislature is subject to question. With the proviso in effect, former testimony in criminal cases
not covered by the criminal statute could not be used; without the
proviso there is no reason why former testimony could not be used
in a case to which the criminal statute does not apply. The desirability of one approach over the other is a question apart from
whether the result of the statutory revision is consistent with the
intent of the Legislature.
The use of former testimony against an accused in a situation
to which the criminal statute does not apply would not contravene
the confrontation provision of the Florida Constitution. The Blackwell case 2 held that one confrontation was sufficient; although the
effect of that decision was nullified by the inclusion of the criminal
proviso in the civil statute in 1921, s1 the reasoning as to what would
satisfy the constitutional provision was not affected. The legislative
act could not amend the Constitution; it merely provided that the
79It is, of course, possible that the statute might be interpreted as covering the
entire field and impliedly forbidding the use of former testimony in criminal
cases other than a new trial. Cf. People v. Frank, 132 Cal. App. 360. 22 P.2d 792

(1933).
s0See Davis v. State, 65 So.2d 307, 308 (Fla. 1953).
SiRevision Note, 2 FLA. STAT. §92.22 (1941).
8279 Fla. 709, 86 So. 224 (1920).
s8See Young v. State, 85 Fla. 348, 356, 96 So. 381. 383 (1923).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1957], Art. 2
FORMER TESTIMONY
accused should meet the witnesses against him at every trial, although
less was required to satisfy his constitutional guarantee. With the
proviso eliminated there should be no constitutional objection to
the use of former testimony against an accused in a proper situation
not covered by the 1939 criminal act.
The argument that the civil statute, section 92.22, could apply
in a criminal action was made recently in Davis v. State.8 4 The
former testimony sought to be used had been given at a preliminary
hearing before a county judge. The criminal statute was therefore
inapplicable because there was no new trial involved. The state,
in contending that the civil statute applied, based its argument on a
reading of section 92.22 in conjunction with section 932.31, which
states that rules relating to the competency of witnesses and evidence
in civil cases shall prevail in criminal cases, except when otherwise
provided by law. The Court did not answer this argument because
it felt that, even if section 92.22 could apply to criminal cases, it had
no applicability to the facts at hand. Since the evidence in question
had been given at a preliminary hearing, it was not incorporated in
a record of trial. Therefore, if the civil statute had any applicability,
it would be only as to the second portion of that statute, which the
Court construed to embrace testimony given at a former trial as
distinguished from a preliminary hearing in a criminal case. The
Court also pointed out that the statutes pertaining to preliminary
examinations in criminal cases 5 indicate that the Legislature never
intended that evidence given at a preliminary hearing could be used
in a criminal trial. The Court, therefore, did not answer the defendant's contention that the admission of such evidence violated
his constitutional right of confrontation. In the course of its opinion,
however, the Court indicated that the nature of a preliminary hearing does not afford an accused an adequate opportunity to crossexamine on substantially the same issues as those at the trial.
CONCLUSION

The Florida statute regulating the use of former testimony in civil
cases is not entirely satisfactory. It is the result of a series of amendments designed in some instances to incorporate, in others to frustrate,
the pronouncements of the Court. It distinguishes between evidence
8465 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1953).
S5FLA. STAT.

c. 902 (1955).
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incorporated in the outmoded bill of exceptions or in the record
of the trial and recorded evidence not so preserved. The effect of
this distinction is not at all clear, and there is no apparent reason for
it in view of modern methods of reporting testimony. Both parts
of this statute require a showing that the original witness cannot be
produced. However, in the first portion this requirement is couched
in terms of "can not be had," while the last portion requires that
"a substantial reason [be] shown why the original witness . . . is

not produced." These two phrases probably have the same meaning,
but the difference in terminology merely adds to the confusion.
The approach suggested by the Uniform Rules should be considered for adoption in Florida, at least in regard to civil cases. Its
effect would be to liberalize the prevailing law regarding admissibility of former testimony. This would be in harmony with the
modern cases on the subject, which tend to permit wider use of this
type of evidence.
The Uniform Rules present a more acceptable approach than
the Model Code, which dispenses with the requirement of identity
of parties and issues and relies solely on the test of relevancy for the
admissibility of such evidence. In regard to availability of the witness it is only in a situation in which the witness is available but not
present for cross-examination that the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules differ. In such a case the Model Code leaves admissibility to
the discretion of the trial judge, whereas the Uniform Rules make no
provision for admissibility. In this respect the Model Code presents
a sensible approach to the problem. If the witness is in fact unavailable, there is no reason for excluding the evidence, provided the other
requirements of admissibility are met. If the witness is available and
subject to cross-examination, there is no compelling reason for an
absolute requirement that the live witness be used in preference to
the former testimony. Either party can call the witness if necessary.
When the witness is available but not present for cross-examination,
however, it is reasonable to leave the admissibility of the former testimony to the discretion of the trial judge, so that undue delay in the
trial can be controlled.
Therefore, the preferable solution would be a provision substantially embodying the principles of Rule 63 (3) of the Uniform Rules,
amended to give the trial judge discretion to admit former testimony
when the witness is available but not present for cross-examination.
In any event the Uniform Rules, either amended as suggested, or in
their present form, afford a reasonable and workable solution to the
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problem of former testimony. It should be pointed out, however,
that the Uniform Rules were meant to be adopted as a unit. Each
provision was carefully fitted into the over-all scheme, and this must
be borne in mind when considering proposals for the adoption of part
of the Uniform Rules, or of any approach suggested 'by them.
Concerning criminal cases, the Uniform Rules go beyond the
bounds of the Florida Court's interpretation of the constitutional
right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face.
The present Florida statute pertaining to the use of former testimony
in criminal cases, however, does not provide adequate coverage of the
problem. It mentions only the use of former testimony at a new trial,
leaving its use in other situations in a state of conjecture. It is of
course possible that the Court will hold that the civil statute applies
in a proper case not covered by the criminal statute. That this result
would carry out the legislative intent is by no means clear. Moreover,
the criminal statute limits unavailability to death or absence from the
state, thereby eliminating the use of former testimony in other situations in which the witness is just as unavailable.
Situations involving the use of former testimony may not arise
very often. When the problem does present itself, however,- liberal
provision should be made for the use of this generally reliable type
of evidence. The attainment of a just result should not be hampered
by ambiguous and unduly restrictive requirements often based on outmoded or misconceived reasons.
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